The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, which was held at Seoul COEX, came to an end on March 27th following two days of discussion between 57 leaders from states and international organizations.
The possibility of nuclear terrorism became a real threat after 9/11, which increased the importance of strengthening nuclear security to prevent nuclear materials from being misused by terrorist groups. There is a need to recognize the importance of nuclear security at the summit level and seek cooperation, as the threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be addressed by a single nation.
The Nuclear Security Summit, the largest diplomatic event South Korea has ever hosted, is the second of its kind since the inaugural gathering in Washington two years ago, hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama.
Korea has established its status as an advanced country by securing the hosting of a whole range of international meetings in the economic, cultural, and sports fields including the hosting of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit. The holding of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit means that Korea has gained even greater standing in the international community in the security field as well. In addition, it is meaningful that Korea is playing a leading role in establishing global governance in the security and political fields just as it played a significant role in the economic field through the hosting of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit.
At the end of the two-day Nuclear Security Summit, top leaders from 57 nations and international organizations, including Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, endorsed the Seoul Communique, citing "substantive progress" in their efforts over the past two years to prevent nuclear terrorism. A third summit will be held in the Netherlands.
The Seoul Summit produced concrete and visible plans to implement an international consensus on the issue, thereby taking one step forward to realizing a world without nuclear terrorism.
Leaders announced voluntary measures they have taken or plan to take, and further adopted the 'Seoul Communique' which lays out comprehensive and specific measures to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. The Communique emphasizes the importance of securing and eliminating HEU; encourages States, by the end of 2013, to announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimize the use of HEU; encourages the universal adherence to relevant international instruments, in particular seeking to bring into effect the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by 2014; and welcomes the establishment of Centers of Excellence for training and education in nuclear security.
The Seoul Summit broadened the scope of discussions on nuclear security by comprehensively addressing issues both dealt with at the Washington Summit - including the protection of nuclear materials and facilities and countering nuclear smuggling, as well as new issues such as the nexus between nuclear safety and security and the protection of radioactive sources.
In particular, in addition to individual national commitments, multiple voluntary joint proposals were announced on countering nuclear smuggling, the security of sensitive information, transport security and other key areas. Such explicit joint efforts by states suggest a new model for international cooperation in nuclear security.
The Korean Government, as the Chair, facilitated the deliberations and announced measures that Korea has taken to strengthen nuclear security, as well as future projects to be conducted in cooperation with other countries.
Meanwhile, Leaders agreed to hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, which attests to the international community's commitment to maintain the momentum generated by the Summit process. When they reassemble in 2014, Leaders will review the progress made on the commitments made in Seoul, as well as discuss further measures to enhance nuclear security.
The selection of Korea as host of the 2012 Summit reflects the international community's recognition of its world-class nuclear technology, its compliance with NPT obligations and its exemplary use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The hosting of the Nuclear Security Summit on the Korean peninsula was highly significant given its implications within the context of denuclearization.
Participants
Heads of 53 states which participated in the 1st Washington Nuclear Security Summit. (South Korea, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Ukraine, USA, Vietnam).
Heads of international organizations which participated in the Washington Summit (the UN, IAEA, and EU). INTERPOL was added to the group of participants as agreed upon between the participating countries and international organizations.
Agenda Preparations
Sous-Sherpa Meeting (Seoul, Korea) June 27-28, 2011
The Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting was held to prepare for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit with 120 (Sous-) Sherpas from 46 countries and four international organizations (UN, IAEA, EU, and INTERPOL) invited to Seoul Summit slated for March 2012. The Sous-Sherpas consulted primarily on the major substance of the Seoul Communique, the result document of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The Sous-Sherpas reaffirmed the basic goals and principles on nuclear security agreed upon at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit.
Sherpa Meeting (Helsinki, Finland) October 4-5, 2011
The Sherpa Meeting focused discussions on the Seoul Communique, which was drafted by Korea as the host country of the Seoul Summit. Deputy Minister Kim Bong-hyun presented five principles underlying the drafting of the Seoul Communique: (1) placing nuclear security at the center of the discussion; (2) ensuring the continuity of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, while at the same time, making new progress; (3) ensuring the voluntary nature of national commitments and participation; (4) opting against the creation of a new regime; and (5) respecting President Obama’s vision to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in a four-year lockdown.
The Sherpas focused on including comprehensive and action-oriented measures in the Seoul Communique under the common understanding that the Communique needs to translate the political commitments on nuclear security agreed upon at the Washington Summit into actionable plans. Key nuclear security measures under discussion among Sherpas include:
— Securing high-risk nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium;
— Enhancing the protection of nuclear facilities;
— Creating synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety;
— Preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials;
— Tightening the management of radioactive materials that could be used in dirty bombs;
— Encouraging states to join and ratify the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, the two key nuclear security-related conventions;
— Bolstering the global nuclear security architecture such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, G8 Global Partnership, and the UNSC 1540 Committee
— Expanding support for the IAEA’s nuclear security activities.
The Sherpas held in-depth discussion on addressing the issue of nuclear safety at the Seoul Summit, including ways to incorporate the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety in the Seoul Communique, based on the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March 2011. The Helsinki Sherpa Meeting considerably narrowed the differences in views between participating countries on the structure, direction, and content of the Seoul Communique.
Eminent Persons Group Meeting (Seoul, Korea) November 29, 2012
The Group was established to support the success of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, held a meeting in Seoul at the invitation of President Lee Myung-bak. At the meeting, the Group expressed its strong support for the Seoul Summit and adopted the Joint Statement (full document) containing ten provisions embodying six suggestions for the successful hosting of the Seoul Summit. The Group highlighted the following six items of advice for the success of the Seoul Summit.
First, The Seoul Summit should demonstrate tangible progress in implementing the commitments made at the Washington Summit
Second, The Seoul Summit should propose a practical vision and new concrete measures by setting them out in the “Seoul Communique”
Third, Each participating state undertakes to make significant contributions to the objective of strengthening nuclear security regime
Fourth, The Seoul Summit should contribute to enhancing the public confidence in nuclear energy, which has been undermined since the Fukushima nuclear accident, and actively seek ways to address the threat of radiological terrorism
Fifth, The Seoul Summit should strengthen international and regional cooperation to prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear materials
Sixth, The Seoul Summit should build upon the momentum generated by the Washington Nuclear Security Summit by making efforts to hold a third Summit
Sherpa Meeting (New Delhi, India) January 16-17, 2012
The Sherpa Meeting discussed ongoing preparations for the Seoul event, including the text of the Seoul Communique; the Summit agenda; and protocols. As chair, Korea had extended the invitation to three additional countries, namely, Denmark, Lithuania and Azerbaijan, to the Seoul Summit.
With regard to the Seoul Communique, the participating countries, after in-depth discussions, reached agreement on the majority of the controversial matters, such as minimizing highly enriched uranium. They agreed to finalize the text during the time left until the Summit in preparation of its formal adoption at the Seoul event. The South Korea delegation explained the ongoing preparations for the Seoul Summit, including its schedule, program, agenda, protocols and other administrative matters, and the venue lay-out; and requested participating countries’ active contribution to making the Seoul Summit a success, such as through the attendance of their leaders. Also, the organizing committees of the two pre-summit events - the Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit and the Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium - gave a briefing on the events. The Sherpas met again in Seoul right before the Summit for final preparations for the event.
Side Events
Prior to the summit, on March 23rd and 24th, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit (NIS) took place at the Grand Intercontinental Hotel. Two hundred people, including nuclear industry leaders and representatives of related international organizations, took part in two days of discussions on the theme of “The Role of the Nuclear Industry in Enhancing Nuclear Security and Safety.”
With the overlap between nuclear security and safety a main talking point in discussions of nuclear energy since the Fukushima Incident in March 2011, the main agenda of the NIS was to discuss and promote cooperation between the private and public sectors.
Organized by the Korea Hydro & Power Company, in partnership with more than 15 other local energy, construction, and nuclear power companies, the NIS opened with a congratulatory address by Prime Minister Kim Hwang-sik.
Keynote speeches were delivered by Mr. Roger Howsley, executive director of the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), Mr. Laurent Stricker, chairman of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), Mr. John Ritch, director general of the World Nuclear Association, and Mr. Marvin Fertel, president and CEO of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).
After an evaluation of the recent progress made by international organizations in the nuclear security and safety sectors, summit participants took part in separate working group sessions discussing the minimization of civilian uses of highly enriched uranium, the securing of sensitive information related to nuclear materials and facilities, and the nexus between security and safety post-Fukushima.
The outcome of a final panel discussion was incorporated into a communique to be passed along for consideration by delegates at the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit.
Also on March 23rd, another official NSS pre-event took place at the Grand Hilton Seoul. Over 170 guests from key international organizations in the nuclear security sector, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), joined over 100 locally based nuclear security specialists for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium.
Organized under the theme, “Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance,” this symposium offered participants the opportunity to analyze beforehand the items on the agenda of the Nuclear Security Summit.
The four scheduled sessions look specifically at issues such as the threat of nuclear terrorism and the status of worldwide nuclear security, challenges to nuclear security and possible solutions, the interface between nuclear security and safety, and global nuclear security governance beyond 2014.
Forty-six countries and two international organizations were represented at the symposium. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), the event hosts, invited Mr. Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, to give a keynote address.
Achievements and Commitments
32 countries made over 70 commitments on specific actions to enhance nuclear security at the Washington Summit, and the national progress reports submitted by the participating countries have shown that nearly all of these have been achieved. Many commitments were made from participating countries at the Seoul Summit as was at the Washington Summit.
The following is a summary of the progress made on the commitments announced at the Washington Summit, as well as new commitments made at the Seoul Summit.
Removing HEU or Converting HEU to Non-military Use
Since the Washington Summit, around 480 kilograms of HEU from eight countries have been removed for disposal, an amount enough to produce about 19 nuclear weapons. In addition, several countries newly committed to repatriate their unneeded HEU.
In particular, Ukraine and Mexico accomplished a total "cleanout" of all stockpiles of HEU just prior to the Seoul Summit by returning them to Russia and the US, respectively.
During the past two years since the Washington Summit, HEU equivalent to around 3,000 nuclear weapons in Russia and the US has been downblended to LEU.
On the minimization of the use of HEU, the Seoul Communique encourages participants by the end of 2013 to announce voluntary specific actions to minimize HEU.
It also recognizes that the development, within the framework of the IAEA, of options for national policies on HEU management will advance nuclear security objectives.
Disposing and Securing Plutonium
Russia and the US are working on implementing the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed between the two countries at the Washington Summit, which, when implemented, will result in the disposal of 68 metric tons of plutonium, enough for 17,000 nuclear weapons.
Kazakhstan, in cooperation with Russia, the US, the UK and the IAEA, secured spent nuclear fuel which contained enough HEU and plutonium to make several hundreds of nuclear weapons by moving them to a new facility for a long-term storage in November 2010.
Converting Research Reactors and Medical Isotope Production Facilities using HEU fuel to LEU fuel
The Czech Republic, Mexico and Viet Nam have converted their research reactors using HEU fuel to LEU fuel since the Washington Summit. In addition, several countries have presented their plans to this end.
In particular, it is worthy of note that Belgium, France, South Korea and the US announced a joint project on developing high-density LEU fuel which aims to replace HEU fuels in high performance research reactors. If the technology, which is based on the centrifugal atomization method developed by South Korea, is proven to be effective, it will significantly contribute to the minimization of the use of civilian HEU worldwide.
Furthermore, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the US announced a joint project to convert the production of medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) from the use of HEU targets to LEU targets. This effort represents a meaningful progress both in terms of enhancing human welfare and eliminating the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Strengthening Nuclear Security-Related International Conventions and Multilateral Initiatives
During the past two years since the Washington Summit, 20 additional countries have ratified the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), making the total number of states party to the Convention 55. Meanwhile, 14 countries have newly ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), increasing the number of states party to the Convention to 79. Among the 34 countries which have newly joined the two Conventions, 18 countries are participants in the Nuclear Security Summit. Over 10 additional countries are proceeding with the process of the ratification of the two Conventions. As for South Korea, it obtained the approval of the National Assembly for the ratification of both Conventions in December 2011 and is in the process of amending its domestic law to deposit the instrument of ratification.
With regard to the amended CPPNM, participating states agreed to work together to bring it into force by 2014 as stated in the Seoul Communique.
Six countries - Argentina, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam - have followed through on their pledges made at the Washington Summit to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), thereby making the number of partners to the GICNT 82 in total. In addition, Algeria and Malaysia have indicated their intention to join the GICNT. Kazakhstan became the 24th member to join the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in January 2012. The decision to extend the mandate of the Global Partnership and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) was made in 2011; the Seoul Communique welcomes the extension and encourages wider participation in both initiatives.
The IAEA plans to organize an international conference in 2013 aimed at strengthening coordination and complementarity among the activities of nuclear security-related international initiatives.
Establishing Centers of Excellence
Since the Washington Summit, countries are establishing Centers of Excellence (CoE) to enhance national nuclear security capabilities. In addition to the six countries (China, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan and South Korea) which have announced plans to establish a CoE at the Washington Summit, around ten countries are either establishing a CoE or have plans in this regard.
The IAEA is working to establish an international network between the CoEs to facilitate the sharing of experience, and in so doing, create a synergy effect.
Supporting the Activities of the IAEA
A number of countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Netherlands and the UK, have pledged contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.
Four countries - France, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK - have received a review mission of the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) since the Washington Summit, and Australia, Finland, South Korea, Romania and the US have presented plans in this regard. Countering the Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radiological Materials
51 countries out of the 53 Summit participants are participants in the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database; Singapore became the newest participant early this March.
A number of joint proposals were made on countering nuclear smuggling and on the security of radioactive sources; Japan released a statement on transport security jointly with France, South Korea, the UK and the US. Participants agreed to enhance international cooperation on nuclear forensics which will enable the identification of the origin of stolen nuclear materials.
A number of countries have explained their activities in the Megaport Initiative led by the US to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources through seaports.
South Korea and Viet Nam are working on a pilot project on establishing within Viet Nam a system to track radiological materials using GPS technology in cooperation with the IAEA. The project will contribute to securing and preventing the theft of radiological materials.
Hosting of Nuclear Security Conferences and Events
The US presented its intention to host a first “International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security” by the end of 2012; France plans to host an international conference in 2012 to assist the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; Sweden presented its plan to host the second INTERPOL Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking and Terrorism Analysis Conference in April 2012; Mexico announced that it will be hosting the 2013 GICNT Plenary Meeting; and the Netherlands revealed that it would organize a tabletop exercise in November 2012 to foster international cooperation in the field of nuclear forensics. Finland introduced its plan to host IAEA International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in the fall of 2012. In addition, several countries proposed plans to host conferences and events related to nuclear security.
Plenary Speech
The following are excerpts from President Lee's speech at a plenary session of the Summit.
“The maintenance of peace and security for humankind is a solemn duty that we all assume. Yet, as you are all too well aware, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism pose a grave challenge to peace and security. Realizing a world without nuclear weapons and a world free of nuclear terrorist threats is the earnest wish of all peace-loving people.
We have a long, arduous road ahead of us. Nevertheless, we can realize our dream if we, the Leaders here today, bring together our collective political will.
Should nuclear materials fall into the hands of terrorists, humanity will face a most daunting threat and challenge. This is because there is no effective way to deter terrorist groups from using nuclear materials once they have it. Terrorists know neither mercy nor compromise; they will not hesitate for a moment in taking away innocent lives to obtain their goals.
Moreover, there still exist around the world 1,600 tons of highly enriched uranium and 500 tons of plutonium today. This is enough material to manufacture more than 100,000 nuclear weapons. We must seek a fundamental solution and the most optimal way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to promptly minimize and eventually eliminate excess nuclear materials which can be used as ingredients for nuclear weapons.
Until then, however, we must securely protect our nuclear materials to ensure that it does not fall into the hands of terrorists or criminals possession and prevent illicit trafficking thereof. The primary responsibility rests with individual countries.
Yet international cooperation and coordination is imperative since terrorism knows no borders and because the tragedy of a nuclear terrorist attack is in no way limited to the target country itself. That is the very reason why we are gathered here today.
In this regard, the first Nuclear Security Summit held two years ago in Washington D.C. set an important milestone. We have made meaningful progress over the last two years building upon the Washington Communique and the Work Plan.
It is my sincere wish that during this Seoul Summit we can build on that progress and yield more advanced and practical commitments and agreements. In particular, significant advances must be made in eliminating and minimizing the use of nuclear materials including highly enriched uranium and plutonium; enhancing international cooperation which is crucial in detecting, tracking and responding to illicit trafficking of nuclear material; and securing the universality of international norms.
The Fukushima nuclear accident a year ago awakened the world anew to the imperative need to strengthen safety at our nuclear power plants. We need to address nuclear safety and security in a coherent framework which will ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We can prevent nuclear terrorism if the world, including all the Leaders here, unite and work together. In this age there is no place that can be free from nuclear terrorism. We all share the same fate. I believe that it is our joint responsibility to work towards making a community of peace.
We must show resolve. We must make concrete commitments. And we must take action. We also have a responsibility to our children and to future generations: a responsibility to protect their peace, safety and happiness.
The eyes of the world are upon us to do just that at this Seoul Summit. As Chair, I will do my utmost to make sure, with real outcomes, that we all live up to the expectations. It is in this spirit and with this sense of great determination that I declare this 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit open.
Dinner Meeting
Leaders from 53 states and four international organizations gathered for a Working Dinner on March 26th, the first official program of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The Leaders shared and assessed the progress that has been made in the field of nuclear security since the 2010 Washington Summit.
The Working Dinner was attended only by the Leaders, where they freely shared ideas in an interactive discussion on national actions taken on the measures specified in the Washington Communique and the Work Plan, as well as individual commitments taken. They include actions in eliminating and minimizing nuclear materials; joining and ratifying nuclear security-related international instruments; establishing Centers of Excellence; and supporting the activities of relevant international initiatives.
The results of the Working Dinner revealed that there had been substantial progress since 2010 both on the Washington Work Plan and the individual commitments made by participating states, effectively demonstrating that the Nuclear Security Summit process is indeed contributing to strengthening nuclear security based on a shared understanding of the danger of the threat of nuclear terrorism.
South Korea introduced actions it has taken, including the hosting of the 2011 Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; winning the approval of the National Assembly in December 2011 on the ratification of key nuclear security-related conventions; beginning construction on a Center of Excellence in March 2012; and the establishment of a Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, an independent presidential agency.
President Lee recognized the efforts made by participating states over the last two years, and proposed to discuss measures to further develop the global nuclear security architecture based on achievements made so far at the Summit session the following day.
The morning session on March 27th brought Leaders to share ideas on the topic of 'national measures and international cooperation to enhance nuclear security, including future commitments.'
Global leaders made fresh commitments toward building a safer world without nuclear terrorism, presenting pledged reductions of weapons-grade fissile material, either completed or under way, as evidence that the two-year-old Nuclear Security Summit process is working.
The two-day gathering in Seoul of leaders and high-level representatives from 53 countries and four major organizations around the world ended with a joint declaration, dubbed the "Seoul Communique."
Seoul Communique
The Seoul Communique builds on the objectives and measures set out in the 2010 Washington Communique to identify 11 areas of priority and importance in nuclear security and presents specific actions in each area.
There are a number of points particularly worthy of note in the Seoul Communique. Firstly, it provides important timelines for advancing nuclear security objectives, such as the target year (end of 2013) for states to announce voluntary actions on minimizing the use of HEU and the goal year (2014) for bringing the amended CPPNM into effect. Secondly, it reflects the need to address both the issues of nuclear security and nuclear safety in a coherent manner for the sustainable peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also emphasizes the need to better secure spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Thirdly, it sets out specific measures to prevent radiological terrorism, an issue which was only briefly touched upon at the Washington Summit.
The following is the full text of the Seoul Communique:
“We, the leaders, gathered in Seoul on March 26th-27th, 2012, renew the political commitments generated from the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit to work toward strengthening nuclear security, reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, and preventing terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security. Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation given its potential global political, economic, social, and psychological consequences.
We reaffirm our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Committed to seeking a safer world for all, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. We recognize that the Nuclear Security Summit is a valuable process at the highest political level, supporting our joint call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. In this regard, we welcome the substantive progress being made on the political commitments of Participating States since the Washington Summit. We stress the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control, and to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. We likewise recognize the fundamental responsibility of States to maintain effective security of other radioactive materials.
We reaffirm that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Noting the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in facilitating international cooperation and supporting the efforts of States to fulfill their nuclear security responsibilities, we further stress the importance of regional and international cooperation, and encourage States to promote cooperation with and outreach activities to international partners. Noting the Fukushima accident of March 2011 and the nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety, we consider that sustained efforts are required to address the issues of nuclear safety and nuclear security in a coherent manner that will help ensure the safe and secure peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
We will continue to use the Washington Communique and Work Plan as a basis for our future work in advancing our nuclear security objectives. At this Seoul Summit, we agree that we will make every possible effort to achieve further progress in the following important areas.
Global Nuclear Security Architecture
We recognize the importance of multilateral instruments that address nuclear security, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). We therefore encourage the universal adherence to these Conventions. We urge states in a position to do so to accelerate their domestic approval of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, seeking to bring the Amendment into force by 2014. We acknowledge the important role of the United Nations (UN) in promoting nuclear security, support the UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1977 in strengthening global nuclear security, and welcome the extension of its mandate. We will strive to use the IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities document and related Nuclear Security Series documents, and reflect them into national practice.
We recognize the contributions since the 2010 Summit of international initiatives and processes such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, within their respective mandates and memberships. We welcome the wider participation in the GICNT and the Global Partnership and value its extension beyond 2012. Noting the importance of strengthening coordination and complementarity among nuclear security activities, we welcome the proposal of the IAEA to organize an international conference in 2013. We welcome contributions from the industry, academia, institutes and civil society that promote nuclear security.
Role of the IAEA
We reaffirm the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework, and recognize the value of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013. We will work to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to support the implementation of nuclear security objectives. To this end, we encourage States in a position to do so and the nuclear industry to increase voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, as well as in-kind contributions. We also encourage continued IAEA activities to assist, upon request, national efforts to establish and enhance nuclear security infrastructure through its various support programs, and encourage States to make use of these IAEA resources.
Nuclear Materials
Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium require special precautions, we re-emphasize the importance of appropriately securing, accounting for and consolidating these materials. We also encourage States to consider the safe, secure and timely removal and disposition of nuclear materials from facilities no longer using them, as appropriate, and consistent with national security considerations and development objectives.
We recognize that the development, within the framework of the IAEA, of options for national policies on HEU management will advance nuclear security objectives.
We encourage States to take measures to minimize the use of HEU, including through the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, where technically and economically feasible, taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical isotopes, and encourage States in a position to do so, by the end of 2013, to announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimize the use of HEU. We also encourage States to promote the use of LEU fuels and targets in commercial applications such as isotope production, and in this regard, welcome relevant international cooperation on high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of research and test reactors.
Radioactive Sources
Taking into account that radioactive sources are widely used and can be vulnerable to malicious acts, we urge States to secure these materials, while bearing in mind their uses in industrial, medical, agricultural and research applications. To this end, we encourage States in a position to do so to continue to work towards the process of ratifying or acceding to the ICSANT; reflect into national practices relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary document on the IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources; and establish national registers of high-activity radioactive sources where required. We also commit to work closely with the IAEA to encourage cooperation on advanced technologies and systems, share best practices on the management of radioactive sources, and provide technical assistance to States upon their request. In addition, we encourage continued national efforts and international cooperation to recover lost, missing or stolen sources and to maintain control over disused sources.
Nuclear Security and Safety
Acknowledging that safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment, we affirm that nuclear security and nuclear safety measures should be designed, implemented and managed in nuclear facilities in a coherent and synergistic manner.
We also affirm the need to maintain effective emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities in a manner that addresses both nuclear security and nuclear safety. In this regard, we welcome the efforts of the IAEA to organize meetings to provide relevant recommendations on the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety so that neither security nor safety is compromised.
We also welcome the convening of the High Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security initiated by the UN Secretary-General, held in New York on September 22nd, 2011. Noting that the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials also includes spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, we encourage States to consider establishing appropriate plans for the management of these materials.
Transportation Security
We will continue efforts to enhance the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in domestic and international transport, and encourage States to share best practices and cooperate in acquiring the necessary technologies to this end. Recognizing the importance of a national layered defense against the loss or theft of nuclear and other radioactive materials, we encourage the establishment of effective national nuclear material inventory management and domestic tracking mechanisms, where required, that enable States to take appropriate measures to recover lost and stolen materials.
Combating Illicit Trafficking
We underscore the need to develop national capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and prosecute illicit nuclear trafficking. In this regard, we encourage action-oriented coordination among national capacities to combat illicit trafficking, consistent with national laws and regulations. We will work to enhance technical capabilities in the field of national inspection and detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials at the borders. Noting that several countries have passed export control laws to regulate nuclear transfers, we encourage further utilization of legal, intelligence and financial tools to effectively prosecute offenses, as appropriate and consistent with national laws. In addition, we encourage States to participate in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database program and to provide necessary information relating to nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control.
We will work to strengthen cooperation among States and encourage them to share information, consistent with national regulations, on individuals involved in trafficking offenses of nuclear and other radioactive materials, including through INTERPOL's Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization.
Nuclear Forensics
We recognize that nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. In this regard, we encourage States to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities. In this regard, they may combine the skills of both traditional and nuclear forensics through the development of a common set of definitions and standards, undertake research and share information and best practices, as appropriate. We also underscore the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics.
Nuclear Security Culture
Recognizing that investment in human capacity building is fundamental to promoting and sustaining a strong nuclear security culture, we encourage States to share best practices and build national capabilities, including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
At the national level, we encourage all stakeholders, including the government, regulatory bodies, industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations and the media, to fully commit to enhancing security culture and to maintain robust communication and coordination of activities. We also encourage States to promote human resource development through education and training. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of Centers of Excellence and other nuclear security training and support centers since the Washington Summit, and encourage the establishment of new centers.
Furthermore, we welcome the effort by the IAEA to promote networking among such centers to share experience and lessons learned and to optimize available resources. We also note the holding of the Nuclear Industry Summit and the Nuclear Security Symposium on the eve of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.
Information Security
We recognize the importance of preventing non-state actors from obtaining information, technology or expertise required to acquire or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes, or to disrupt information technology based control systems at nuclear facilities. We therefore encourage States to: continue to develop and strengthen national and facility-level measures for the effective management of such information, including information on the procedures and protocols to protect nuclear materials and facilities; to support relevant capacity building projects; and to enhance cyber security measures concerning nuclear facilities, consistent with the IAEA General Conference Resolution on Nuclear Security and bearing in mind the International Telecommunication Union Resolution 174.
We also encourage States to: promote a security culture that emphasizes the need to protect nuclear security related information; engage with scientific, industrial and academic communities in the pursuit of common solutions; and support the IAEA in producing and disseminating improved guidance on protecting information.
International Cooperation
We encourage all States to enhance their physical protection of and accounting system for nuclear materials, emergency preparedness and response capabilities and relevant legal and regulatory framework. In this context, we encourage the international community to increase international cooperation and to provide assistance, upon request, to countries in need on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral level, as appropriate. In particular, we welcome the intent by the IAEA to continue to lead efforts to assist States, upon request. We also reaffirm the need for various public diplomacy and outreach efforts to enhance public awareness of actions taken and capacities built to address threats to nuclear security, including the threat of nuclear terrorism.
We will continue to make voluntary and substantive efforts toward strengthening nuclear security and implementing political commitments made in this regard. We welcome the information on the progress made in the field of nuclear security since the Washington Summit provided by the participants at this Seoul Summit. The next Nuclear Security Summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014.
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